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SURVEILLANCE AND IDENTITY PERFORMANCE:
SOME THOUGHTS INSPIRED BY MARTIN
LUTHER KING
FRANK RUDY COOPER*
Early morning, April four
A shot rings out in the Memphis sky
Free at last, they took your life
They could not take your pride'
I.
INTRODUCTION: PRIDE AND OUR SURVEILLANCE SUICIDE PACTS
Just before it achieved international superstardom, the band U2
recorded a song called "Pride (In the Name of Love)." It is a tribute to
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Its lyrics, such as "they took your life / they
could not take your pride,"2 suggest that King exemplified inner strength
in the face of adversity. Let us ask what this song would mean as a theory
of self.
In U2's imagination, King had a core self that remained untouched by
what happened to his external self. He died, but his pride lived on. This
follows the Cartesian notion of the self. Descartes says, "I think, therefore
I am.",3 Extrapolating from Descartes, the mind is the core of the self and
the body is superfluous.4 We are essentially the self in our heads rather
Copyright © 2009 Frank Rudy Cooper. Professor, Suffolk University Law School.
Thanks to my excellent research assistant, Paul Lonardo-Roy, excellent research librarian,
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1. U2, Pride (In the Name of Love), on THE UNFORGETTABLE FIRE (Island Records
1984).
2. Id.
3. See RENt DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON THE METHOD AND MEDITATIONS ON FIRST
PHILOSOPHY 3 (David Weissman ed., Yale Univ. Press 1996) (1637).
4. See id at 21 ("And then, examining attentively that which I was, I saw that I could
conceive that I had no body, and that there was no world nor place where I might be; but
yet that I could not for all that conceive that I was not."). In his experiment in the skeptical
method, Descartes quickly regains certainty that his thoughts and his mind exist, leading to
his first principle, "I think, therefore I am," but works through a series of complex logical
maneuvers to return to certainty that his body exists. He persists in concluding that "the
nature of intelligence is distinct from that of the body." Id. at 23.
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than the self we project to the world. Thus, in U2's depiction, King's
essential self was prideful because that was the irreducible characteristic of
his mind; pride was his core.
As a test of whether U2's Cartesian vision of King's selfhood has
utility, we might consider the case of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
(FBI) surveillance of King. Allegedly because of the connection between
Communists and King's black civil rights movement,5 the FBI conducted
extensive surveillance of King. It therefore knew that he was having
extramarital affairs.6 The FBI sent messages to King strongly suggesting
that if he did not commit suicide by a certain date, it would publicize his
affairs.7 The threat to embarrass him and endanger his movement
weighed heavily upon King.8 It may be that he considered killing himself.
It seems that King, far from being the steadfast figure depicted by U2,
struggled with how to respond to the FBI surveillance. Ultimately, King
decided to act as though he either did not know about or did not care
about the FBI surveillance.9 But that was an act. King and his advisors
debated about whether to expose the FBI's campaign against him and
decided it would ultimately do him more harm than good."0 Thus, King
may or may not have felt as proud as he acted in the face of FBI
surveillance. There is, therefore, a tension between thinking of King as
having a core self that was prideful and thinking of that prideful self as
nothing more than a performance.
In keeping with Judith Butler's theory of performativity, I will suggest
that the performance of identity is all that identity consists of.1 We are no
5. But see DAVID J. GARROW, THE FBI AND MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 67 (1981)
(describing U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy's disappointment with the lack of hard
or documentary evidence in an FBI report calling King a Communist).
6. Id. at 105-06 (describing inception of surveillance of King's personal conduct).
7. See NICK KOTZ, JUDGMENT DAYS: LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON, MARTIN LUTHER
KING JR., AND THE LAWS THAT CHANGED AMERICA 247 (2005) ("King was convinced that
the FBI was trying to drive him to commit suicide.").
8. See GARROW, supra note 5, at 218 (discussing the increase in the intensity of King's
self-criticism caused by his "knowledge that the FBI appeared to be watching his every
action").
9. See KOTZ, supra note 7, at 233 (describing King as "turn[ing] the other cheek").
10. Id. See also GARROW, supra note 5, at 203 (describing fears of King being
besmirched by public discussion of FBI surveillance).
11. See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF
IDENTITY 33 (2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE] (describing how
gender is performatively produced). Butler "draws a distinction between performance
(which presupposes the existence of a subject) and performativity (which does not)." SARA
SALIH, JUDITH BUTLER 45 (2002) (explicating Butler's theory of subjectivity). Throughout
this article, when I say that someone performs her identity, I do not mean to imply that I
agree that there is a Cartesian subject doing the act (nor do I mean to argue fully here that
there is no subject whatsoever), but only that a person is performatively constituting herself
in a particular way. For further thoughts on the performativity of gender, see, for example,
JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF "SEX" (1993)
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more than what we pretend to be. The external self we project to others is
as "real" as the internal self that we feel we are holding back. So we need
not resolve the issue of whether King's pride was how he really felt or just
an act. If King played a proud individual on television, that was as true a
part of his identity as any other. This performative notion of the self has
implications for how we think about surveillance; I will start to map out
those implications in this essay.
A novel way of thinking about the FBI's surveillance of King is that the
FBI had a suicide pact with King. The FBI had offered King a one-sided deal:
destroy yourself or we will use our surveillance to destroy you. It may be,
however, that this suicide pact was not so one-sided. The FBI may have been
destroying itself at the same time it tried to destroy King.'2 In the mid-1970s,
the Church Committee would reveal the nature of the FBI's 1960s
surveillance activities. Revelation of the FBI's surveillance of King was a
centerpiece of the Church Committee's criticisms of the FBI. 3 As a result of
the Church Committee's report, Congress attempted to seriously curtail the
FBI's surveillance powers. 14 The FBI's suicide pact with King wound up
being mutual: we will destroy ourselves in an attempt to destroy you.
The dynamics of this suicide pact may well be reproduced in the United
States's contemporary surveillance regime. The surveilled are encouraged to
destroy themselves in order to avoid surveillance. Meanwhile, the FBI destroys
itself, whether it is eventually curtailed or not, in the process of surveying its
citizenry. The surveilled are encouraged to destroy themselves in at least two
ways. First, surveillance chills.15  When we believe our expressions or
associations might be surveilled, we curtail our activities by a wider berth than is
necessary in order to assure we are in compliance with official norms.16 Second,
[hereinafter BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER] and JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH: A
POLITICS OF THE PERFORMATIVE (1997) [hereinafter BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH].
12. See generally KOTZ, supra note 7, at 384 (reporting that U.S. Attorney General
Clark started to believe that the FBI's campaign against King was harmful to the nation's
best interests).
13. See generally S. REP. No. 94-755, bk. III (1976) [hereinafter CHURCH COMMITTEE
REPORT] (dedicating a chapter to a case study of FBI surveillance of King).
14. See Natsu Taylor Saito, For "Our" Security: Who is an "American" and What is
Protected by Enhanced Law Enforcement and Intelligence Powers, 2 SEATTLE J. Soc.
JUST. 23, 40 (2003) (discussing FBI attempts to revive 1960s-style tactics).
15. See CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 13, at 184 ("[lIt beggars the
imagination not to believe that the [Southern Christian Leadership Conference], Dr. King,
and all its leaders were not chilled or inhibited from all kinds of activities, political and even
social." (quoting Harry Wachtel)).
16. See generally Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives. Informational Privacy and the
Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1426-28 (2000) (arguing that the negative effects
of surveillance go beyond chilling to actually change the content of people's characters and
their capacity for choice and democracy).
Reprinted with the Permission of the New York University School of Law
20081
N. Y. U. RE VIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE
and more relevant to performativity theory, pervasive surveillance encourages
people to perform their identities in certain ways and discourages them from
performing their identities in other ways." Surveillance curbs dissenters more
than those in the mainstream and thus maintains the status quo.18 Meanwhile,
the government destroys itself by means of its own surveillance. This is so
assuming that what makes our form of government special is its commitment to
the self-actualization of its citizens. 19
Self-actualization is the process whereby people create their own
identity by means of experimenting with different behaviors. It is possible
for people to live in an environment that is more or less alienating to the
way in which they perform their identities. Performativity scholars such as
Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati say that people can have an internal
sense of self that is distinct from the identity that others attribute to
them.2" Kenji Yoshino emphasizes that individuals may self-actualize but
only when they are generally free to perform their external identity in
ways that are consistent with their internal senses of self without fear of
repercussions.21 I argue that while the internal sense of self is not more
real than the performance of the self, allowing people to make their
internal and performed selves consistent will make people feel more self-
actualized. Our government is at its best when it maximizes the ability of
individuals to self-actualize through identity performance.
Certainly, others have pointed to the self-actualization problem,22 but I
hope to add to the discussion of surveillance an understanding that the
identity that is harmed is performatively constituted. In Part II of this essay, I
briefly describe the FBI's surveillance of King. In Part III, I identify some
aspects of the debate over the Fourth Amendment's application to
17. See Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1264, 1267-70 (2004) (describing Foucault's analysis of the normalizing effects of
the Panopticon).
18. See, e.g., CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 13, at 3 ("The unexpressed
major premise of the programs was that a law enforcement agency has the duty to do
whatever is necessary to combat perceived threats to the existing social and political
order.").
19. See Solove, supra note 17, at 1268 (contrasting the goals of a Big Brother society-
"to suppress all individuality, to force everybody to think and act alike"-with the goals of
our government-"to be free and democratic").
20. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV.
1259, 1261 n.2 (2000) (distinguishing between "sense of self" identity and "attributal"
identity, while acknowledging some interplay).
21. See KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS
(2006). For a compelling extension of Yoshino's work, see generally Angela Onwuachi-
Willig, Volunteer Discrimination, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1895 (2007) (applying
performativity theory to the National Basketball Association's mandatory dress code).
22. See, e.g., Alan F. Blakley, Privacy. The Delicate Entanglement of Self and Other, 3
RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 172, 181 (2006) ("The creation of a unique self, or personality,
in a removed 'field of operation within which to engage in the conscious construction of
self' is necessary." (quoting Julie E. Cohen, supra note 16, at 1424)).
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surveillance. In Part IV, I summarize the performativity theory of identity. In
Part V, I speculate on how the performativity thesis might change our
perspective on the Fourth Amendment's application to surveillance.23
II.
OUR PAST: THE FBI'S SURVEILLANCE OF KING
In order to make the case for a performative model of the Fourth
Amendment, it is helpful to have a sense of what has gone wrong in the
past. A perfect case study for that purpose is the FBI surveillance of King.
Although there were no statutory guidelines in place at the time, the FBI's
surveillance was clearly inappropriate. This is uncontroversial.
Simultaneously, it may have violated the Fourth Amendment. 24  The
surveillance seems to have resulted from a combination of factors: FBI
Director J. Edgar Hoover's paranoia and racism, President Kennedy's
reluctance to pick a fight with Hoover, and President Johnson's voyeurism
and fear of the FBI Director.
The FBI began surveilling King in earnest when it learned that he was
a friend of Stanley Levison. 25 Levison had been connected with the U.S.
23. The Fourth Amendment reads as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Much of my earlier scholarship is about the Fourth Amendment.
See generally Frank Rudy Cooper, Cultural Context Matters.- Terry 's "Seesaw Effect, "56
OKLA. L. REV. 833 (2003) (explaining how the Terry decision's rearticulation of the
Fourth Amendment ignores the risk of a swing between racial profiling and depolicing
and demonstrating the existence of that seesaw effect in New York City in the 1990s);
Frank Rudy Cooper, The "Seesaw Effect" from Racial Profiling to Depolicing: Toward a
Critical Cultural Theory, in THE NEW CIVIL RIGHTS RESEARCH: A CONSTITUTIVE
APPROACH 139 (Benjamin Fleury-Steiner & Laura Beth Nielsen eds., 2006) [hereinafter
Cooper, The "Seesaw Effect' (reviewing critical race theory and law and cultural studies
scholarship as applied to the Terry doctrine's tendency to cause a swing between racial
profiling and depolicing); Frank Rudy Cooper, The Un-Balanced Fourth Amendment- A
Cultural Study of the Drug War, Racial Profiling andArvizu, 47 VILL. L. REV. 851 (2002)
(arguing law enforcement used the drug war to convince the Supreme Court to accept the
biased tactic of racial profiling). For my take on how masculinity impacts police officer
behavior, especially during Terry stops, see Frank Rudy Cooper, "Who's the Man?":
Masculinities and Police Stops (Dec. 28, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) (explicating masculinities studies literature, developing a theory of masculine
police officer behavior, analyzing how the Terry decision reflects assumptions about
masculinity, and proposing training programs).
24. See generally United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972)
(discussing constitutionality of warrantless surveillance authorized by the Attorney
General).
25. See GARROW, supra note 5, at 43, 94-95 (explaining the FBI's interest in Levison).
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Communist Party, and Hoover alleged concern that the Communists were
instigating the black civil rights movement. 26  The FBI conducted
microphone surveillance of Levison's office without obtaining prior
approval from any source because no constitutional, statutory, or policy
guidelines seemed to apply.27 Soon thereafter, President Kennedy's
Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, approved the wiretap of Levison's
phone.28 Robert Kennedy also approved wiretaps on King's close advisor,
Clarence Jones, though not on King himself.29 The FBI then provided
Robert Kennedy with reports alleging that King had communist
connections.3" Robert Kennedy found the reports dubious,31 but approved
limited surveillance of King on a trial basis and asked to be updated on any
communist connections.32
The FBI was undaunted by its failure to discover the communist
connections it sought and instead developed a new interest: King's
personal life. When the FBI discovered King's philandering, Hoover
encouraged collection of evidence of the affairs, approving an FBI
report that claimed, "It is highly important that we do develop further
information of this type in order that we may completely discredit King
as the leader of the Negro people."33 This sentiment was echoed in a
statement by Bureau Internal Security Supervisor Seymor F. Phillips,
who declared in a memo that "[i]t would be most desirable to effect as
much technical-type coverage as can be safely done to cover King's
activities" so as "to gain further evidence of the activities of this moral
degenerate."34 After the memo had been typed, someone thought to
handwrite an insert professing interest in King's philandering "in view
of his association with Communists., 35  When President Johnson's
Attorney General, Nicholas Katzenbach, ordered the FBI to obtain his
permission for microphone surveillance as well as wiretapping, the FBI
sent him memos alleging they were seeking to overhear subversive
advice being offered by noted leftists Levison, Jones, Harry Wachtel,
and Bayard Rustin.36 According to King scholar David Garrow,
however, "[t]hese claims were merely a cover for the Bureau's
26. David Garrow suggests Hoover's fears of communist involvement were honestly
held. See id at 95.
27. Id at 46.
28. Id
29. Id. at 64-65.
30. Id. at 67.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 72-73.
33. Id. at 106 (quoting FBI memo).
34. Id. at 117 (quoting Seymor F. Phillips).
35. Id at 117-18.
36. Id. at 138.
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continued interest in King's personal life.",37 The FBI even resorted to
outright lies to justify its surveillance. For example, Hoover contended
Levison had written one of King's speeches criticizing the Vietnam War
even though the FBI's own wiretaps revealed that Levison had
criticized the speech as intemperate.38 The surveillance ended not
because the FBI satisfied its curiosity about King's personal life but
because of imminent Congressional hearings on surveillance by federal
agencies. Missouri Senator Edward V. Long's probe caused Hoover to
become cautious.39 The FBI discontinued its surveillance of King from
this point through to his assassination.4"
Still, we might ask why no authority challenged the FBI's longstanding
surveillance of a man dedicated to peaceful advocacy for equality. As
historian Nick Kotz notes, "[t]hrough the years a succession of presidents
had found it easier simply to accept Hoover's defamatory reports than to
challenge his power."41 Why? President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy
probably did not have time to see the full scope of the problem and might
not have had enough entrenched power to challenge Hoover. President
Johnson may have been handcuffed by the benefits he enjoyed as a result
of FBI surveillance, both as a voyeur and as someone who made use of the
agency's reports against his enemies. Senator Richard Russell noted in his
diary that despite Johnson's complaints about the FBI's frequent
surveillance reports, in actuality "he love[d] it."42 Further, Johnson made
political use of the FBI reports against his enemies; indeed, "[o]ne slip-up
by the FBI agents, and the president might have had his own
"413Watergate ....
Outside the White House, Eugene Patterson, editor of the newspaper
the Atlanta Constitution, was critical of the FBI's attempt to smear King
but did nothing." Editors and reporters apparently prioritized
maintaining their FBI sources above challenging Hoover's abuse of
power.45 King himself was powerless to stop the surveillance. He feared a
confrontation would provoke Hoover, and President Johnson had
previously failed to come to King's defense.46 King's advisors had also
37. Id
38. KOTZ, supra note 7, at 376-77.
39. GARROW, supra note 5, at 149-50.
40. Id. at 150.
41. KOTZ, supra note 7, at 104.
42. Id. at 200 (quoting Senator Richard Russell).
43. See id at 216-18 (describing Johnson's use of wiretapping to counter a political
challenge by the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party).
44. See id. at 239 (describing Patterson's interaction with the FBI).
45. See id at 249 (criticizing the failure of newspapers to report on the King
surveillance).
46. Id. at 233.
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warned him that an account of the FBI surveillance would result in the sort
of public smearing of King's character that the FBI sought.47
Given that the FBI's surveillance of King was so controversial as to
eventually result in a congressional investigation, what was its ultimate
motivation? For Hoover, a general paranoia, in addition to outright
racism, may explain his focus on King.48 At a lower level, Garrow
identifies two sources of FBI domestic intelligence head William Sullivan's
interest in King: "a Puritanism on matters of personal conduct and sexual
behavior that stemmed from his own rural New England background, and
a subconscious racism that was more the paternalistic superiority of a false
white liberal than the open hatred of a rabid bigot., 49
As Jerry Kang and others have noted, subconscious racism explains a
great deal of past and present disparate treatment of racial minorities.5"
The idea of moral conservatism also seems to have great explanatory
power here. Garrow goes on to connect the FBI surveillance of King to
protection of the status quo:
The Bureau functioned not simply as a weapon of one disturbed
man, not as an institution protecting its own organizational
interests, but as the representative, and at times rather irrational
representative, of American cultural values that found much
about King and the sixties' movements to be frightening and
repugnant.5'
So a basic conservatism, in the sense of desiring to preserve the status quo,
undergirds the explicit and implicit racism that motivated FBI surveillance
of King. This explanation is consistent with legal scholar Natsu Saito's
analysis of the FBI's surveillance programs throughout its existence. Her
example of the worst of it is COINTELPRO, the 1960s operation that
involved the disruption of Leftist and racial minority organizations through
tactics ranging from fomenting conflicts within and among groups to
outright assassination.52  Saito links current surveillance to
COINTELPRO, arguing that "the state's law enforcement and intelligence
powers are being used to protect the status quo-which includes but is not
limited to its racial hierarchy-rather than the people as a whole."53 The
FBI's surveillance of King comported with this objective.
47. GARROW, supra note 5, at 203.
48. C. KENNETH O'REILLY, "RACIAL MATrERS": THE FBI's SECRET FILE ON BLACK
AMERICA, 1960-72, at 355 (1989) (arguing Hoover's surveillance of King and other black
leaders stemmed from racism).
49. GARROW, supra note 5, at 164.
50. See Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1514 (2005)
(describing extensive psychological research on implicit prejudice).
51. GARROW, supra note 5, at 212-13.
52. See Saito, supra note 14, at 38-39.
53. Id at 31.
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For our purposes, the past use of surveillance to protect the status quo
is significant because it suggests that surveillance encourages particular
identity performances and discourages others. Surveilling King
discouraged him from having any ties to Communists. The mechanism of
this discouragement was the threat to disrupt King's ability to perform the
identity of moral leader. Since that identity was crucial to King's liberation
strategy, surveillance was an effective means of censoring King's
associations.
III.
THE PRESENT OF SURVEILLANCE LAW: THE DEBATE OVER THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
I have claimed that King was censored by the FBI's threat to disrupt
his performance of a particular public persona. King was effectively
censored even though he won numerous First Amendment cases
confirming his speech and associational rights. As the Church Committee
reported, quoting Harry Wachtel on FBI surveillance, "it beggars the
imagination not to believe that the SCLC [Southern Christian Leadership
Council], Dr. King, and all its leaders were not chilled or inhibited from all
kinds of activities, political and even social." 54 King thus needed not only
freedom of expression but also freedom from surveillance.55 The Fourth
Amendment guarantees such a right. This prompts an inquiry into the
current interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, a task complicated by
the existence of two distinct principles governing Fourth Amendment
application. One principle is that the Fourth Amendment prevents
physical intrusions into constitutionally protected areas. The other is that
the Fourth Amendment prevents any intrusion into an individual's
protected interests. This part of the essay examines those principles and
identifies opposing arguments with regard to the proper use of
surveillance.
Before discussing the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to
surveillance, I will provide a brief primer on the Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment protects the "right of the people to be secure"
by providing that there shall be no "unreasonable" search or seizure
and that "probable cause" is required to obtain a warrant prior to such
an intrusion. A "search" occurs when the government obtains
information about a person for which she has a "reasonable expectation
54. CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 13, at 184.
55. On the necessity of a synergy between the First and Fourth Amendments, see
Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 123
(2007), stating that "uninhibited conversations, association, and exchange of ideas can be
stifled by the searching light of government inquest and observation."
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of privacy."56 Reaching into a suspect's pocket is a paradigmatic search.
A "seizure" occurs when the government interferes with one's
possessory interest in an object, including one's person.57 Handcuffing
someone in order to arrest her is the paradigmatic seizure. In theory,
the validity of an intrusion is always judged by determining its
reasonableness, which is accomplished by weighing the government's
interests against the individual's interests."8  However, the Court
generally proceeds by category: if it is a certain type of seizure or
search, police officers get to do all of the things allowed for that
category without further case-by-case analysis.59 One way to think
about this is to say that an intrusion of a particular scope requires a
particular level of justification, which I call the "scope continuum
approach."60
The degree of Fourth Amendment scrutiny applied to a search or
seizure depends upon the scope of the intrusion.6 For instance, the level
of the intrusion may be "nothing," as when an officer encounters a civilian
on the street and gazes upon her (a potential search lacking a reasonable
expectation of privacy) or stops the person to ask ordinary questions about
her identity and her business in the area (a potential seizure lacking a
reasonable expectation of privacy/possessory interest).6 2 If the officer has
no Fourth Amendment justification for the intrusion, the person need not
answer questions and can go about her business.63 The level of intrusion
56. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(establishing expectation of privacy approach). See also 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C.
MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.03[C] (4th ed. 2006) (discussing
principles behind the Fourth Amendment).
57. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 747-48 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(describing interest harmed by seizure of property as possessory). The interest in not
having your person seized seems to arise from the inherent reasonableness of one's
expectation of privacy/possessory interest in one's self. This is a slightly different interest
than one's interest in the privacy of one's person, which is what the search of a person
threatens.
58. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22-27 (1968) (balancing the governmental interest in
police safety and effectiveness with the individual's privacy right in the stop and frisk
context).
59. See id at 20-22 (describing balancing approach); DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra
note 56, at § 2.07[A] (describing debate over the contrast between bright-line and case-by-
case analysis).
60. See Cooper, The "Seesaw Effect," supra note 23, at 142-44 (discussing Terrys
scope continuum approach).
61. See id at 143.
62. See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200-01 (2002) (noting that a seizure
does not occur where a reasonable person would feel free to disregard police requests and
continue going about her business) (citing California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628
(1991)).
63. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 34 (White, J., concurring) (contending refusal to comply
with a Terry stop cannot itself furnish the justification for an arrest but may alert the officer
to the need for continued observation). But see generally Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist.
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might also rise to the level of a "stop" or "frisk." A stop occurs when a
reasonable person would not believe she was free to leave, but only for a
limited period of time while the officer confirms or dispels suspicion of
criminal activity.' A frisk occurs when an officer intrudes upon a person
or her objects, but only by patting down the outer surface of the person or
thing in order to confirm or dispel a suspicion that weapons are present.65
The level of an intrusion might also rise to the level of an "arrest" or "full
blown search." An arrest occurs when an officer's actions would lead a
reasonable person to conclude that she was not free to leave and would be
under police control for a long period of time.66 A full-blown search
occurs when officers intrude inside objects, such as within a cigarette pack
that was in a person's jacket.67 Finally, the level of the intrusion might be
"extraordinary." An extraordinary intrusion occurs when a seizure or
search is "conducted in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to an
individual's privacy or even physical interests., 68 Examples are "seizure
by means of deadly force," warrantless entry into a home, and physical
intrusion into the body.69
Originally, the Fourth Amendment applied to surveillance only when
the government entered a constitutionally protected area. The Court's
1928 decision in Olmstead v. United States"° allowed the authorities to
surveil civilians so long as they did not commit a physical trespass of
constitutionally protected space."1 Following one model, the home (or
office) was at the center of Fourth Amendment protection, the curtilage
immediately surrounding the home received less protection, and
Court, 542 U.S. 177 (2004) (providing civilians may be arrested for noncompliance with a
state statute requiring identifying oneself to a police officer).
64. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-22 (defining the test for the validity of a stop).
65. See id. at 10, 29-31 (laying out the principles governing a frisk).
66. See Ochana v. Flores, 347 F.3d 266, 270 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that custodial arrest
occurs where a reasonable person would view the degree of restraint of freedom of
movement as corresponding with that which the law associates with formal arrest).
67. See generally United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (upholding search of
pockets incident to lawful arrest).
68. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818 (1996).
69. Id.
70. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
71. Id. at 464 ("The amendment does not forbid what was done here. There was no
searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing
and that only. There was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants."). See also On Lee
v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 751-53 (1952) (finding no Fourth Amendment "search and
seizure" violation and no trespass because there had been consent to enter); id at 753
(distinguishing cases of problematic seizure because this case rests "in the field of mechanical or
electronic devices designed to overhear or intercept conversation . . .where access to the
listening post was not obtained by illegal methods"). See generally Tracey Maclin, Hoffa v.
United States: Secret Agents in Private Spaces, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 181 (Carol S.
Steiker ed., 2006) (critically tracing development of Olmsteadline of cases).
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unoccupied and undeveloped areas were generally unprotected.7 2 This
may be referred to as the "protected areas" model of the Fourth
Amendment.
The model for the Fourth Amendment's protection of privacy changed
in 1967, with Katz v. United States.73 In Katz, the Court protected a
bookie from having his conversation intercepted even though he could
readily be observed placing a phone call from a public phone booth.74 The
Court said,
[t]he Government stresses the fact that the telephone booth from
which the petitioner made his calls was partly constructed of glass,
so that he was as visible after he entered it as he would have been
if he had remained outside. But what he sought to exclude when
he entered the booth was not the intruding eye-it was the
uninvited ear.75
The Katz decision rejected the Olmstead approach, holding instead that
"the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places., 7 6 The general test
for whether the Fourth Amendment governs a search is to ask whether the
individual had a "reasonable expectation of privacy., 7   People are
protected when they seek to exclude others from knowing certain
information. 78 By contrast, information an individual "knowingly exposes
to the public" may be surveilled by the authorities. 79 This is a move from
protecting a physical realm of privacy to protecting a symbolic realm of
privacy. Thus, it may be referred to as the "protected interests" model of
the Fourth Amendment.
Eventually, however, the Court blended the protected areas and
protected interests theories of privacy. In Kyllo v. United States, it
extended protection to a man who might not have had a reasonable
expectation of privacy under the Katz decision because the authorities
detected his marijuana farm by monitoring the level of the heat that
escaped from a certain part of his home.8" He might have lacked a
72. See, e.g., ROBERT M. BLOOM & MARK S. BRODIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE POLICE 24-25 (5th ed. 2006) (depicting concentric circles
representing the levels of constitutional protection for each type of area).
73. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
74. Id. at 352-53.
75. Id. at 352.
76. Id at 351.
77. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (recounting rule emerging from previous
cases that "there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable"').
78. See id. at 351-52 ("What a person... seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.").
79. Id. at 351.
80. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29-30 (2001).
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protected interest in privacy on grounds that he "knowingly expose[d]" his
heat.8" Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for a 5-4 majority that defied the
Court's usual divisions. He declined to apply the Katztest, stating,
[t]he Katz test.., has often been criticized as circular, and hence
subjective and unpredictable. While it may be difficult to refine
Katz when the search of areas such as telephone booths,
automobiles, or even the curtilage and uncovered portions of
residences is at issue, in the case of the search of the interior of
homes.., there is a ready criterion, with roots deep in the
common law, of the minimal expectation of privacy that exists,
and that is acknowledged to be reasonable.82
With those words, Scalia rejected the Katz approach, at least under
certain circumstances. The new test, which relies heavily on the old spatial
approach to privacy, holds that in certain places, the authorities may not
surveil to obtain evidence they could not otherwise have obtained absent a
physical intrusion. The Kyllo test prohibits "obtaining by sense-enhancing
technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could
not otherwise have been obtained without physical 'intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area."' 3  Such surveillance "constitutes a
search-at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in
general public use."84
We see the relationship between the Katz and Kyllo tests in the
questions Scalia posed. First, he asked whether police enhanced their
senses.85 By implication, if the government detected the contraband by
ordinary senses, the subject does not deserve the protection of a right of
privacy. That is effectively the Katzprotected interests approach. Second,
the information must be related to the interior of a home.86 This
effectively mirrors the Olmstead protected areas approach. Third, the
information must not have been otherwise obtainable without a physical
intrusion.87 Again, then, Olmstead appears to be the guide for the rule.
Fourth, the technology must not be in general public use.8" That rule
resonates with Katz's requirement that you do not knowingly expose
private facts to the public's view.
I argue that the Kyllo doctrine is basically Olmstead, but with a Katz
kicker. The Olmsteadportion of the doctrine is the limitation of the Kyllo
81. See id. at 41-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 34 (citations omitted).
83. Id. (citation omitted).
84. Id
85. Id. ("obtaining by sense enhancing technology").
86. Id ("any information regarding the interior of the home").
87. Id. ("that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical 'intrusion ....
88. Id. ("where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use").
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protection to particular spaces. The Katz portion of the doctrine is the
requirement that the technology not be in general public use, making it
reasonable to expect privacy. So, the Kyllo test only applies when both a
certain type of space is surveilled in a way that substitutes for a physical
trespass and the expectation of privacy is reasonable.
I am concerned that the Kyllo reasoning represents a significant retreat
from Katzs protections. Because the surveilled information must be related
to the home, Kyllo returns to the Olmstead notion of constitutionally
protected areas. This implies you do not have an expectation of privacy
elsewhere. Further, the fact that the information must be unobtainable
without a physical intrusion suggests that you do not have an expectation of
privacy if the information could have been otherwise discovered.
Consequently, the Kyllo model of the Fourth Amendment only protects
against the equivalent of the police sneaking into your home. Finally, the
implication of Kyllo's "not in general public use" requirement is that once a
significant portion of the public has a particular technology, you can no longer
expect privacy from that device. The Fourth Amendment thus has a waning
effect with respect to new technologies; at first it strenuously protects the
home, but then its value to individuals decreases. 89
Even if we found Kyllo's holding to be appropriate, its reasoning
raises another crucial question for scholars of surveillance: who should
bear the burden when new technologies do not easily fit within the
preexisting Fourth Amendment framework? After the PATRIOT
Act,9" which seemed to encourage greater wiretapping of recently
developed technologies such as email, policymakers face the dilemma of
where to allocate the burden when new technologies are in their
nascent state. 91 We could presume the government needs to satisfy the
Fourth Amendment when using these technologies or assume they may
escape Fourth Amendment scrutiny until new privacy frameworks are
developed to address them.
Legal scholar Orin Kerr supports the conservative approach, noting
with approval that
89. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 132 (4th ed. 2004) ("The most telling criticism of the dissenters concerned the
majority's 'not in general public use' qualification, which they condemned as 'somewhat
perverse because it seems likely that the threat to privacy will grow, rather than recede, as
the use of the intrusive equipment becomes more readily available."') (quoting Kyllo, 533
U.S. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
90. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56,
115 Stat. 272 (2001).
91. See generally Eric Weiner, The Foreign Service Intelligence Act: A Primer,
NPR.ORG, Oct. 18, 2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyid=15419879
(last visited Apr. 3, 2009) (noting the controversy over post-PATRIOT Act interpretations
of and revisions of existing surveillance law).
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[t]he courts have sanctioned a wide range of invasive warrantless
surveillance techniques that threaten privacy but not property. So
long as the surveillance does not invade the individual's right to
exclude others-the very essence of the property right-the
surveillance generally does not violate his reasonable expectation
of privacy. 
92
Kerr's approach is basically the Kyllo approach.93 That approach has
many problems,94 but I am most concerned that it places the burden of
new technology onto private individuals rather than state authorities. In
contrast, legal scholar Daniel Solove would place the burden of new
technology onto the government out of concern that allowing the
authorities to test new technologies in secret would inevitably lead to
violations of privacy." The scholarly debate boils down to the question of
whether privacy is in little need of protection from new technologies
because we have property rights or most endangered precisely when the
government has new technologies.
An under-recognized reason to place the burden on the government is
that surveillance stifles a person's ability to perform her identity as she
sees fit. Just as King was harmed when surveillance caused him to curtail
some of his associations, contemporary groups are harmed even when
surveillance merely chills the identity performance of their members. To
understand the nature of that harm, we need to develop a fuller
understanding of how identity is performative. Accordingly, I now turn to
an explanation of how people perform their identities.
IV.
THE PRESENT OF IDENTITY: A PRIMER ON PERFORMATIVITY
The problem with surveillance is not just privacy, but performativity.
This section summarizes a theory of identity that builds upon one of the
most significant developments in the humanities over the last two decades:
Judith Butler's theory of gender identity as performative. Three aspects of
Butler's argument warrant explication. First, our performances of gender
constitute the very things they are thought to express; masculine and
92. Orin Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths
and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 813 (2004) (footnote omitted).
93. Kerr cites Kyllo for the proposition that police can invade a homeowner's privacy
by peeking in her window from the street. Id.
94. For instance, it might make the extent of one's privacy more a function of the
extent of one's property than does the Katz doctrine.
95. See Solove, supra note 17, at 1301 ('National security' has often been abused as a
justification not only for surveillance, but also for maintaining the secrecy of government records as
well as violating the civil liberties of citizens.").
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feminine actions do not express an internal biological or transcendental
essence. Second, gender is performative in that we are not free to enact
our identities just as we wish; cultural norms provide a limited set of
"scripts" for what will constitute intelligible enactments of
masculinity/femininity. Finally, performativity is an interactive process.
The acts of others help constitute me as having a certain identity, but my
own actions help constitute my own and others' identities. With gender as
an example, I now trace those three aspects of identity.96
A. Gender as Constituting the Thing It Is Said to Express
Butler's primary argument is that there is nothing more to gender than
its performance. There is no such thing as gender if what you mean by that
term is that my genetics imply that I should play a certain social role.97
There is no biological essence that precedes and dictates the deeds we
explain based on gender. It is the meaning we choose to make of
biological difference that creates our sense of gender. To say that gender
is performative, therefore, is to say that our performances of gender
constitute the very thing they are said to express.98
How can there be no such thing as gender until we perform our
identity as though we had a gender? Butler's concept of performative
gender is similar to J.L. Austin's concept of the performative utterance, 99
although the former elaborates upon the latter quite significantly. Austin
notes that certain words, when spoken under certain conditions, not only
signify linguistic meaning but also constitute an action.' 0 For instance, to
say "I do" under the right circumstances can create a marriage.
Similarly, for Butler it is the performative utterance "It's a boy!" that
makes that person a boy.'' One concrete example of that process is the
96. For another summary of Butler's theories in relation to race, see Frank Rudy
Cooper, Our First Unisex President?" Black Masculinity and Obama's Feminine Side, 86
DENV. U. L. REV. (2009) (applying critical race theory and masculinities studies to
discourse on whether Obama is "our first female President").
97. To address a frequently raised objection to the social construction theory of
gender, it may indeed have been that men's tendency toward greater height and upper-
body strength made them the more efficient hunters when we were solely hunter-gatherers.
But who says we must organize all of the large portion of remaining social relations based
on what might have been the best way to hunt large animals? Is not the point of having an
opposable thumb that we can choose to organize ourselves differently than a pack of
hyenas? Women need not be stuck in the home just because of biological difference;
something else about the social construction of relations is at play.
98. BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 11, at 33 (arguing that gender is
performatively produced).
99. See generally J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS (J.O. Urmson &
Marina SbisA eds., 1955) (discussing concept of performative utterance).
100. See id. at 6-7.
101. See BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER, supra note 11, at 7-8 (considering
interpellative force of a doctor naming a newborn a "he" or a "she").
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story of nineteenth-century French hermaphrodite Herculine Barbin. At
birth, doctors evaluated Barbin and, because his "penis" was too small,
declared him a girl. 2  After Barbin had a sexual relationship with a
woman, her "clitoris" was reevaluated, and she was declared a man.
10 3
Both of Barbin's genders were real only in the sense that they were
declared to be such. But those performative utterances made the gender
designations a reality because Barbin was forced to try to conform with the
given designation.l" It was Barbin's attempt to perform his/her identity as
female or male that made her/him a boy or girl at a given time. In that
sense, gender is nothing more (and nothing less) than the effect of the
meanings we attach to bodily configurations and behaviors.
Nevertheless, "identities are created in the very performance of
imagined identities."'15  We are what we do. Acting aggressively and
explaining it to yourself and others as reflecting your masculinity creates
the impression that your masculinity preceded and generated the acts. In
fact, our performance of masculinity as though it were reflective of a
preceding biological imperative to be aggressive constitutes masculinity as
the biological imperative it is said to express. We do not simply perform a
preexisting gender identity but bring into being the identity we think of
ourselves as merely expressing.
B. Gender Performativity as Constrained by Cultural Norms
We can now turn to the second sense in which gender is performative
and ask the following question: if gender comes into being only because of
its being performatively constituted, what is the process by which gender
maintains its existence? The answer is that we perform our gender by
citing to preexisting norms, a process that may also be understood as our
performance of "scripts." The beginning of the process of our being
gendered, according to Butler, is our being normalized into and made to
conform with one of this culture's two fixed categories of gender. That
process performatively makes us a boy because henceforth we will be
treated as a boy. And it does so by citing to precedent: people with one
bodily configuration have traditionally been treated as boys and people
with another bodily configuration have traditionally been treated as girls.
102. HERCULINE BARBIN, HERCULINE BARBIN: BEING THE RECENTLY DISCOVERED
MEMOIRS OF A NINETEENTH-CENTURY FRENCH HERMAPHRODITE 124 (Richard McDougall
trans., 1980). On the process of determining the sex of people with equivocal genitalia, see
Nancy Ehrenreich & Mark Barr, Intersex Surgery, Female Genital Cutting, and the
Selective Condemnation of "Cultural Practices," 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 71, 97-104
(2005) (reviewing the practices of and justifications for genital surgeries).
103. BARBIN, supra note 102, at 86-89, 124-28.
104. See Michel Foucault, Preface to BARBIN, supra note 102, at xi.
105. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, LANGUAGE OF THE GUN: YOUTH, CRIME, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 158 (2006) (describing Butler's performativity theory).
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Further, the original affixing to someone of a particular identity creates its
own precedent for following other scripts. The boy's masculinity will be
reiterated by dressing him in blue rather than pink, expecting him to be
aggressive, and so on. One becomes a boy, and later proves that one is a
man, by following the cultural norms prescribed for the behavior of men.
For Butler, "[i]f a performative provisionally succeeds.., then it is...
because that action echoes prior actions, and accumulates the force of
authority through the repetition or citation of a prior and authoritative set
ofpractices.'10 6
A consequence of the way in which gender operates through the
citation of precedent is that being a certain gender requires following
certain preexisting scripts. The forced repetition of preexisting scripts is
how those scripts are reproduced as the present rather than merely the
past.° 7 Hence, gender may be described as "the repeated stylization of the
body, a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame that
congeal over time to produce the appearance of substance, of a natural
sort of being." '' Despite the implication that we freely choose to adopt
certain styles, however,
Butler is not suggesting that the subject is free to choose which
gender she or he is going to enact. "The script," if you like, is
always already determined within this regulatory frame, and the
subject has a limited number of "costumes" from which to make a
constrained choice of gender style. 109
Certain acts would not be intelligible as describing a particular gender because
we do not yet have a set of understandings about what they mean. 1 There is
a tacit collective agreement to perform gender only in certain ways. The
dominant ideologies of gender thus provide a structure within which one acts.
The preexisting social structure reproduces itself by inducing the individual to
become the type of person that fits within the social structure."'
106. BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH, supra note 11, at 226-27.
107. See, e.g., id. at 18 ("In Mari Matsuda's formulation, for instance, speech does not
merely reflect a relation of social domination; speech enacts domination, becoming the
vehicle through which that social structure is reinstated.").
108. BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 11, at 43-44.
109. SALIH, supra note 11, at 63.
110. For example, I can choose to act in ways we refer to as "metrosexual" or the
"macho" ways we associate with police officers, but I cannot truly recover my "Ashante
Warrior" manhood of sixteenth-century Africa or really live as a twenty-third century
"omnisexual" in the twenty-first century United States. The term "metrosexual" was coined
to describe urban straight men who dress and act in ways associated with gay men. See
Wikipedia, Metrosexual, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metrosexual (last visited Apr. 3,2009).
111. See BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH, supra note 11, at 33 ("The mark interpellation
makes is not descriptive, but inaugurative. It seeks to introduce a reality rather than report
on an existing one; it accomplishes this introduction through a citation of existing
convention.").
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In sum, while we are what we do, we are not free to perform our
identity just as we please. Instead, we are born into a preexisting
framework of cultural norms that restricts our ability to imagine an
outside-the-box identity. That framework also restricts the realm of
performances others will understand as intelligible enactments of gender.
We perform our identities, but much of the script has already been written.
C Identities as Intersubjectively Constituted
Having recognized that gender is performative both in the sense of
constituting that which it is said to express and in the sense of being largely
scripted by cultural norms, we should now consider how performativity
operates in interpersonal interactions. Here, I will make an analogy
between the performativity of gender and the performativity of race. For
example, legal scholar Richard Ford laments that whites sometimes try to
give him a "soul handshake" that they would never attempt with fellow
whites. 12 Such experiences demonstrate that while we are what we do, we
are also what we are treated as. Just as Ford could constitute his own
identity by acting in certain ways, the whites who offer Ford a soul
handshake have performed his identity. In their gestures of associating
Ford with blackness, they have constituted Ford as black. Ford seemingly
resists that characterization. His true self, it would seem, is colorblind.113
His being treated as black, however, makes him black. His acceptance or
rejection of the soul handshake will be read as a black man accepting or
denying his blackness. Even my critique herein of Ford's complaint locks
him into blackness. 114
But Ford stops short of understanding that the manner of his response
gives him some ability to performatively reconstruct both his own blackness
and the race of his interlocutor. He could say, "Gee, I always thought of
myself as white, but I guess we're both black." Ford would then call the
assessment that he is black into question (perhaps he is a dark-skinned
Italian), call his interlocutor's asserted whiteness into question (perhaps he
knows the handshake because he is only passing as white), and call the very
112. See HARCOURT, supra note 105, at 158-59 (quoting Richard T. Ford, Beyond
"Difference" A Reluctant Critique of Legal Identity Politics, at 19 (paper delivered to
Spring 2002 Faculty Workshop Series at Harvard Law School, May 1)).
113. For a brief critique of colorblindness, see Frank Rudy Cooper, Against Bipolar
Black Masculinity: Intersectionality, Assimilation, Identity Performance, and Hierarchy, 39
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 853, 882-85 (2006) (arguing that black men are incentivized to accept
corporate colorblind norms).
114. Not being a vulgar social constuctionist, I do not see this as a crime. See
Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT
FORMED THE MOVEMENT 357, 375 (Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Neil Gotanda, Garry
Peller & Kendall Thomas eds., 1995) ("To say that a category such as race or gender is
socially constructed is not to say that that category has no significance in our world.").
Reprinted with the Permission of the New York University School of Law
20081
N.Y.U. REVIEW OF LAW& SOCIAL CHANGE
reality of race into question (perhaps it is a social construction that should be
discarded). Ford's use of performativity theory to question race thus says too
little. Race, like gender, is interactively performative. The interactive nature
of that performativity opens up possibilities for re-performing the exchange.
We can draw insights from analysis of Ford's example that also apply
to gender. First, our performance of our gender identity is influenced by
how others treat us. As legal scholars Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati
suggest, we have an "attributed identity," which is the identity that others
ascribe to us.'15 Any contrary sense we have of ourselves must negotiate
with that identity.116 We are not fully in control of our own identity
because we always act against the backdrop of other people's
interpretations of our identity. Hence, we "work" our identity by acting in
ways that we hope will cause people to perceive us in a particular way.'17
For example, one may turn her office lights on and leave a jacket on her
chair before leaving work in order to create the perception that she is
working late and is thus a hard-working person.118
Second, because our performance of gendered identity constitutes that
supposedly precedent identity, when others influence how we perform our
identity, they influence who we are. That influence may be abstract, as
when cultural norms constrain what performances we can imagine and
what performances others can understand. The influence might also be
concrete, as when people impose an attributed identity upon us. For
example, because of prevailing cultural stereotypes, a Korean law associate
may have the attributed identity of being detail-oriented but lacking
leadership skills." 9 That attributed identity will make it less likely that she
will be given opportunities to lead and thereby affect her ability to actually
attain leadership skills.
Third, though our performative identities are constrained by the
actions and beliefs of others, we play a part in the process because our
actions influence others' perceptions of us. In Ford's example, he is not
fully constrained by others' attributions of identity to him since he can
influence both how others see him and how the others are seen.
Accordingly, the constitution of identity is an intersubjective process.
D. How Surveillance Alters Identity Performance
The first point regarding performativity and surveillance is that we are
what we do. 2 ° We create our identities by acting in ways that are designed
115. Carbado & Gulati, supra note 20, at 1261 n.2 (defining "attributal" identity).
116. See id. (contrasting aspects of identity).
117. See id. (contrasting aspects of identity).
118. See id. at 1260 (using this example).
119. See id at 1268-69 (providing this example).
120. See discussion supra part IV.A.
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to give others a certain impression of us. 121 Since performance constitutes
identity, safeguarding the ability of individuals to perform their identities
as they see fit is crucial to the possibility of self-actualization. As the FBI
surveillance of King demonstrates, surveillance has the power to prevent
people from performing their identities as they would see fit. 122 As I noted
in the introduction, when the government destroys self-actualization it
commits suicide because it eviscerates that which makes our democracy
unique.
It is important to recognize that surveillance does not merely suppress
an essential self. If there were an essential self, it might not do harm for
surveillance to force someone to hide her true self as long as it did not
force her to change this true self. Under the performativity model,
however, something crucial is always lost when we are surveilled. Given
Austin's notion that speech may amount to action, censorship through
surveillance may hinder action.123 Surveillance stops one from performing
one's self and thus from being one's self. Consequently, it does not follow
that surveillance is acceptable so long as it merely compels people to hide,
but not to change, their selves. Since performing one's self is how one is
one's self, to impel a person to hide a version of herself necessarily forces
her to change her self.
A second point that emerges from performativity theory is that
surveillance changes people by means of pressuring them to adhere to
preexisting cultural norms. If identity is performatively constituted,
surveillance does not just breach an artificially created realm of privacy,
but remolds persons in the image preferred by the status quo. The usual
concern with surveillance is that its chilling effect censors and suppresses
the speech of its subject.124 Butler suggests that censorship is instead "a
way of producing speech, constraining in advance what will and will not
become acceptable speech." 121 One who speaks under surveillance does so
"only in the context of an already circumscribed field of linguistic
possibilities." 126  Surveillance operates performatively because it targets
speech against the status quo, 127 impelling one to perform one's identity in
121. See generally Carbado & Gulati, supra note 20 (discussing the ways in which
people engage in identity impression management).
122. See discussion supra part II.
123. See generally AUSTIN, supra note 99 (defining and analyzing performative
utterances).
124. See Dru Stevenson, Entrapment and Terrorism, 49 B.C. L. REV. 125, 157 (2008)
("Surveillance bothers Americans, perhaps, because of the chilling effect it has on
cherished freedoms, like free speech and freedom of association . .
125. BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH, supra note 11, at 128.
126. Id. at 129. Butler also says, however, that censorship never fully shuts down
speech, in general, or the agency of the speaker, in particular. See id (suggesting that
"speech exceeds the censor by which it is constrained").
127. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
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conformity with the status quo and thereby reproducing the preexisting
social structure. 
128
Surveillance does this because identity performance is constrained by
cultural norms, which surveillance helps to set. As I noted in Part II, the
surveillance of King was ultimately about maintaining a status quo that the
FBI believed was threatened by King's civil rights work.129 Viewed through a
performative lens, surveillance is revealed as a way of producing status quo
identities and eliminating alternative identities. If one analogizes identity
performance to the selection of costumes, 130 surveillance molds our sense of
which costumes are acceptable, and thus prevents us from wearing the outfit
that might have suited us best. While we do have some say in what identities
we try on, we are constrained by what our audience refuses to accept."'
Finally, surveillance is a strong form of audience influence on the
performance of identities. In the case of surveillance, the audience is the
government. If Richard Ford complains that being given a soul handshake
locks him into a certain version of blackness, how might he feel if he were
surveilled if he acted too black (or too white)? 13 2 Likely, he, and anyone
else, would feel they were required to do more "work" to maintain their
identity.133 For example, after September 11, there may be a higher cost to
performing a Muslim identity because that might subject an individual to
surveillance.' The surveillance itself implies the possibility of
punishment, either officially or via the type of harassment King suffered.'35
Some might try to avoid the punishment by covering up their Muslim
identity.'36 Since the theory of performativity says that how we act is who
we are, being pressured into performing in certain ways remakes us at a
fundamental level.
V.
CONCLUSION: TOWARD A PERFORMATIVITY-MAXIMIZING FUTURE
Having mapped out the past of surveillance and its present as a matter
of Fourth Amendment law and of identity performativity, I now wish to
speculate on what a performativity-maximizing Fourth Amendment might
128. See discussion supra part IV.B.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
130. See discussion supra part IV.B.
131. See discussion supra part IV.C.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 112-14.
133. See discussion supra part IV.C.
134. See DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 104 (2003) (arguing that post-9/11 profiling of Arab
and Muslim men shows the endurance of racial essentialism).
135. See discussion supra part II.
136. See generally YOSHINO, supra note 21 (describing theory that people cover
denigrated identities).
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look like. The future of surveillance law needs to free people to perform
their selves in any way they wish. Surveillance, at least when not based on
probable cause, is often more problematic than productive because it has the
broader effect of preventing people from performing their identities as they
see fit, thereby preventing them from becoming the people they can be.
That basic insight about surveillance and identity performance
leads to four insights about the Fourth Amendment issues that were the
subject of Part III. First, in order to maximize identity performance,
the Fourth Amendment must reject the spatial models of privacy
suggested by the Olmstead and Ky11o decisions. Those models fail us
because they are based on where you are, not who you are.
Consequently, they cannot begin to account for the ways in which
surveillance might impel an individual to perform her identity in
conformity with the status quo.
Nor is the Katz model of privacy sufficient. A second performativity
insight is that we need to provide at least some protection for people to
express themselves to others. From a performativity perspective, the
fundamental problem with Katz is its holding that anything one knowingly
exposes to public view is unprotected.137 For example, the "misplaced
trust" doctrine makes less sense when one considers identity to be
performative. That doctrine says that no reasonable expectation of privacy
exists whenever one shares information with another.'38 So Jimmy Hoffa
could not claim privacy against an undercover agent's revelation of his
criminal plans even though he went to great pains to keep the
conversations secret.139 Hoffa was said to have assumed the risk that his
confederate would share his statements with the government. 4 ° But there
is a difference between a friend possibly leaking an imperfect version of
your statements and the government's recording the statement verbatim.
An analysis informed by performativity theory supports the notion that
people need an audience to which they might express themselves to in
order to self-actualize. It thus makes sense to require the authorities to
have a "reasonable" basis for setting up a false audience.14" ' The misplaced
trust doctrine assumes that if we really valued what we were saying or
doing, we would keep it from everyone else. Such a jurisprudence of
137. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (declaring that "knowingly
expose[d]" information is unprotected).
138. See LAFAVE, ISRAEL & KING, supra note 89, at § 3.2 (describing misplaced trust
doctrine).
139. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (stating that no Fourth
Amendment violation existed because Hoffa relied on his misplaced confidence that the
individual with whom he spoke would not reveal his wrongdoings).
140. Id at 303.
141. Here I mean "reasonable" in the sense of the Fourth Amendment's broad
prohibition of "unreasonable" searches and seizures. In my view, reasonableness requires
probable cause on the Hoffa facts.
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hermits does not suit a world in which identity is performatively and
intersubjectively constituted.
A third performativity insight is that Katz's focus on the reasonableness
of an expectation of privacy always limits an individual's freedom to perform
her identity to the bounds of status quo acceptability. 42 Just as people are
made to conform to cultural norms for gender behavior, they may be so
constrained with respect to any type of performance of their identities. 43 The
"scripts" for culturally acceptable behavior are always wedded to what has
happened up to that point. We thus need to not only reject the Olmsteadand
Kyllo approaches, but also imagine beyond the Katz decision and develop a
performativity-maximizing model of the Fourth Amendment.
Fourth, all of this leads to the insight that the burden of new technologies
must be placed on state authorities, not civilians. This is so because of three
principles that emerge from Part IV's analysis of the application of
performativity theory to surveillance. First, we must protect an individual's
ability to perform her identities as she sees fit. Since surveillance dampens
identity performance, we ought to craft a presumption against the use of new
surveillance technologies. Second, we must avoid promoting status quo
identities over alternative identities. Allowing the use of new surveillance
technologies would make it more likely we would suffer that harm. Finally,
we must be conscious of the fact that an audience's response can stifle a
person's belief that she is free to perform her identities as she wishes.
Allowing the state to weigh-in in favor of the status quo by means of
surveilling dissidents without passing Fourth Amendment muster dampens
people's performative freedom.
In this essay, I do not have a goal of turning the four performativity
insights discussed above into doctrinal solutions. Instead, I suggest a sort
of disposition toward the Fourth Amendment." While it is often argued
that we all want the social control that surveillance begets, that argument is
largely false. We do not value social control unconditionally, for we want
only as much social control as is necessary to control crime. We balance
our desire for control of crime with a simultaneous desire to promote
142. Here I mean "reasonable" in the limited sense of an expectation of privacy that
society is prepared to accept as reasonable under Katz analysis. See Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (describing the requirement that a subjectively held
expectation of privacy also be reasonable).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 107-11. For a discussion of how cultural
norms of identity influence the application of doctrines, see Cooper, The Seesaw Effect,
supra note 23.
144. One obvious example of a doctrinal move of which I do not approve is the USA
PATRIOT Act. That Act heightens the problem of status quo reinforcement by
encouraging the development of new surveillance technologies and lowering of the
threshold of justification required for searches. Because we value self-actualization, we
must reject such moves.
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freedom of thought and action. 145  Reactionaries are fond of saying
"freedom ain't free"146 ; we might respond by saying "security is
meaningless if it destroys liberty."
As this study of the FBI's surveillance of King demonstrates, state
authorities should not be allowed to decide which expressions of identity
are reasonable because they are inherently agents of the status quo. Since
unfettered surveillance power encourages the government to curtail the
freedom to perform one's identities, it amounts to a suicide pact whereby
the government destroys itself in the name of self-preservation. We should
void that pact by placing the burden of persuasion on the government
when it argues new technologies are consistent with the Fourth
Amendment.
145. See Solove, Reconstructing Surveillance Law, supra note 17, at 1267-70
(contrasting benefits and harms of surveillance).
146. For a play on the phrase, see Brother Ali, Freedom Ain't Free, available at
http://www.lyricsmania.com/lyrics/brother-ali-lyrics-12206/the-undisputed-truth-lyrics-42
256/freedomaint-freejlyrics_457551.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2009).
Reprinted with the Permission of the New York University School of Law
20081
Reprinted with the Permission of the New York University School of Law
